Hope Trans LLC: Inside the Chameleon Carrier Network Behind the I-20 Tragedy
- CellEx Consulting
- Aug 8
- 15 min read
By Safety Lane Investigations Team
Safety Lane investigates: How one fatal decision, a web of fraud, and a network of linked companies led to the deaths of six people.
No- We’re Not a Gossip Column — But This Story Needs to Be Told
At Safety Lane, we’re not in the business of chasing rumors or parading around as “hard-hitting investigative journalists.” We leave the trench coats and fedora hats to Hollywood. What we are is unapologetically obsessed with transportation — how it works, why it fails, and what happens when the rules designed to keep people alive are treated like suggestions. We've seen it all before....
This isn’t about sensationalism. This is about reality. A reality where bending the rules might keep your wheels turning for a while… until the day it all comes crashing down — sometimes literally. And when that day comes? Let’s just say when the ship starts sinking, the mice scatter, and you’ll be left holding the wheel (and the bill).
So, buckle up. This isn’t going to be light reading, but it will be important reading. Because this case is one of the clearest, loudest, and most tragic reminders that in trucking, shortcuts don’t save time — they cost lives. And the web of deception we’re about to unravel is big enough to make even seasoned industry vets raise an eyebrow… or two.
The Hope Trans Web — Chameleon Carriers, Tragedy, and the Danger of Looking Away
Most crash investigations take hours, maybe a day or two— a few phone calls, a handful of public records, and the puzzle comes together.
This one? This was different.
This case isn’t just another “bad carrier” story. It’s a blueprint for how some in this industry use loopholes, shell companies, and identity swaps to dodge the very regulations designed to protect the public. And the result? Five lives lost, multiple families destroyed, and a tangled corporate network that’s still — as of this writing — operating in the shadows.
Reader Advisory: This is long and dense on purpose.
The Crash That Started It All
At 9:35 a.m. on June 28, 2025, Interstate 20 near Terrell, Texas, became a scene of chaos. An 80,000-lb semi-truck barreled into slowed traffic, slamming into a Ford F-150 carrying members of the McKellar family. The crash involved seven vehicles, including two tractor-trailers, and left a trail of wreckage that shut down the highway for hours.
Why? The official cause: driver fatigue — he fell asleep at the wheel.
The Aftermath:
The impact triggered a deadly chain reaction — six people lost their lives, three more were critically injured.
By the time the road was cleared:
Zabar McKellar,
Krishaun McKellar,
Kason McKellar (16),
Billy McKellar (grandfather), and
Nicole Gregory of Dallas
were dead.
The only survivor from the family’s Ford F-150, 20-year-old Evan McKellar, was rushed to intensive care but later died in the hospital..
Weeks later, González-Companioni was charged with five counts of involuntary manslaughter and four counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, held on $2.25 million bond.
But the crash was only the start of a much bigger story.
At 27, Gonzalez-Compagnoni faces five counts of manslaughter and one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, according to the Texas Department of Public Safety. On July 1, the Kaufman County Sheriff’s Office added three more counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon—in this case, the truck—bringing the total to nine charges.
Bail was set at $250,000 per charge, totaling $2.25 million. He was arrested at 1:22 AM on June 29, 2025, and remains in the Kaufman County Jail.
But his road to I-20 began long before that day—before the truck, before the CDL, before the U.S. border.
From Cuban Politics
to U.S. Trucking
According to available records, Alexis Osmani González-Compagnoni held Spanish citizenship before making his way to Cuba, where he actively supported Fidel Castro’s regime. Despite this political affiliation, he was later allowed to legally enter the United States.
Immigration records show that Alexis Osmani González-Companioni entered the U.S. in 2020 on a 90-day ESTA visa via Spanish citizenship, intending to pitch an energy-saving app. Instead, he found himself driving a semi across America.
Before leaving Cuba, González-Companioni was deeply embedded in the Cuban political structure:
President of the University Student Federation (FEU) at the Central University of Las Villas’ Electrical Engineering faculty.
Elected to the Provincial Committee of the Young Communist League (UJC) in Villa Clara.
In 2019, Twitter suspended his account for spamming pro-Castro hashtags such as #SomosCuba and #SomosContinuidad.
Under 8 U.S. Code § 1182, members of foreign Communist parties—or anyone who misrepresents facts to obtain visas—are barred from entering the U.S.
Yet, within hours of digging online, we found public evidence linking Gonzalez-Compagnoni to Cuba’s Communist Party. So how did federal agencies—with billion-dollar budgets, satellites, and international databases—miss it?
Or did they find it… and decide not to see it?
Either way, he overstayed his visa, obtained a CDL, and gained legal clearance to drive a 40-ton truck thousands of miles across American highways.
This didn’t happen by accident—it was the product of federal blind spots, bureaucratic delay, and deadly complacency. And when the system sleeps, the price is paid in human life.
A GoFundMe and a Social Media Post
In the days after the crash, a GoFundMe appeared in his name, claiming he was “going through a very difficult time.” On Facebook, he said he didn’t want the money—but the campaign remained active for a time before being removed.
Hope Trans LLC – The Carrier Behind the Crash
(Disclaimer: The following section and image credit go to WFAA, Dallas, Texas.)
“I Need Coffee” — Allegations of Falsified Logs and Pushed Limits
“I need coffee” — Fake documents and driver pressure
A former Hope Trans driver told WFAA he drove a USPS load from Atlanta to Phoenix solo—just weeks before the crash—after only three hours of sleep.
“I next-day shipped it… off of three hours of sleep,” he said.
Federal law limits truckers to 11 driving hours per day followed by 10 consecutive hours off. But the driver claimed Hope Trans routinely backdated bills of lading to skirt those limits.
“They change the pickup times… push them back if you need more time,” he explained, showing a falsified departure date.
Another former driver backed this up, providing paperwork for a 2,200-mile haul from North Carolina to Utah with the pickup date altered.
“They don’t care about rules,” he said. “They just care about dropping off the load and making that money.”
Both claimed dispatchers used code words to hide hours-of-service violations—“coffee” meant extra drive time. One driver shared what he claimed were messages exchanged via the Telegram app:
Trucker: “I need coffee.
”Dispatcher: “You mean time? Hours?
”Trucker: “Yes.”
Warrant Issued for a Company Official
Alongside the driver’s indictment, prosecutors charged a Hope Trans LLC official with third-degree felony forgery. The allegation?
Falsifying the truck’s cab card — the registration document proving the vehicle’s legal authority for commercial use.
Authorities have not yet publicly released the name. But FMCSA records and corporate filings point to a revolving door of officers, emails, and addresses — a hallmark of what the trucking industry calls a “chameleon carrier.”
A USPS Route That Was Illegal Before It Even Started
This was not just any freight haul—it was a U.S. Postal Service load from Florida to Texas, a journey of roughly 1,856 miles. USPS policy requires team driving for trips exceeding 500 miles.
González-Companioni was alone.
This meant the entire load was in violation of USPS safety policy before the truck even left the terminal. The absence of a second driver on such a long run should have raised immediate red flags at multiple checkpoints—dispatch, USPS contract oversight, and possibly federal inspectors. Yet, the trip went forward.
In 2024, the U.S. Postal Service’s own watchdog sounded the alarm — and what they found should rattle anyone who trusts the mail to arrive safely.
The Office of Inspector General discovered the USPS had no effective system to verify who was behind the wheel of its contracted trucks and no mechanism to track fatal crashes involving those contractors. The numbers tell the rest of the story: from 2018 to 2022, USPS-contracted drivers were involved in at least 373 crashes that killed 89 people.
Even more alarming, the audit revealed that the Postal Service routinely failed to enforce basic, life-saving rules — like requiring two drivers for cross-country hauls to prevent fatigue.
This wasn’t an isolated lapse or a single company cutting corners. It was, and remains, a structural failure of oversight — a breakdown that puts lives at risk every day the system continues as it is.
Hope Trans LLC — Vanishing Into Thin Air
Freight X verified the truck’s USDOT as belonging to Hope Trans LLC. The company’s registered officer at the time, Aishat Magomedova, had a LinkedIn profile naming her CEO of Fiorito Trucking, which disappeared hours after the crash.
Within four days, company data shifted dramatically:
Officer: Magomedova → Todd August
Email: aisha@… → dispatch@…
Address: Tacoma, WA (shared workspace) → Orlando, FL (apartment)
Fleet: 193 trucks → 65
Drivers: 195 → 80
Such changes suggest a deliberate attempt to reset oversight in the crash’s aftermath.
A Safety Risk Hiding in Plain Sight
Bluewire safety analysis scored Hope Trans LLC 50.25 out of 100, classifying it as a high-risk carrier.Key findings:
Safety metrics worsened after a 2023 ownership/management change.
Indicators suggest weakened internal controls and declining safety culture.
Current status:
Status: Active;
Authorized for Property (interstate).
Registered address: 5956 Bent Pine Dr Apt 357, Orlando, FL 32822;
phone (458) 224-8080.
Fleet: 65 power units, 80 drivers.
Declared 2024 mileage: 18,538,652. SAFER Web
Roadside inspections (US, last 24 mo): 297 total;
Vehicle OOS 34.4% (53/154),
Driver OOS 5.4% (16/297). (Nat’l avgs: Vehicle 22.26%, Driver 6.67%). SAFER Web
Crashes (last 24 mo): 0 fatal, 4 injury, 8 tow-away (12 total). SAFER Web
Note: These are FMCSA reportable events without fault assignment.
The Corporate Shape-Shifting of a Chameleon Carrier
Investigators and industry analysts recognize Hope Trans as fitting the profile of a “chameleon carrier”—a company that changes names, officers, and registration details to evade enforcement or reset safety scores.
The Timeline of Transformation
2021 – Hope Trans LLC is registered in Tacoma, Washington, with MANVINDER SINGH listed as principal officer.
2023 - 2025 – Hope Trans LLC is registered in Tacoma, Washington, with Aishat Magomedova listed as principal officer.
Pre-crash, 2025 – Operates nearly 193 trucks with 195 drivers.
Post-crash, July 2025 – Within days:
Magomedova is replaced by Todd August as the listed officer.
Email contact changes from a personal address to a dispatch account.
Company address moves from a month-to-month office space in Washington to an Orlando apartment.
Fleet size drops to 65 trucks and 80 drivers.
But there is a lot more to this story....
On the day of the crash, the listed company officer was Aishat Magomedova — whose now-deleted LinkedIn profile identified her as the CEO of Fiorito Trucking. That profile disappeared within hours of the incident.
The Sister Company Connection
Fiorito Trucking — The Quiet Link
While less publicly discussed than Hope Trans, Fiorito Trucking plays a critical role in the network.
Corporate Connection: Magomedova’s Fiorito profile tied her directly to the leadership of both Hope Trans and the broader fleet web.
Shared Addresses & Contact Info: Before deletion, Fiorito Trucking’s contact details overlapped with other Magomedova-linked entities, including phone numbers and email patterns similar to those used by Bee Zone Logistics and Kardan Trucking.
Possible Asset Sharing: Although VIN records are not as public for Fiorito as for Hope Trans or Bee Zone, industry database traces suggest several tractors were reassigned between DOT numbers, potentially including Fiorito.
Business Model Similarities: Like the others, Fiorito operated with a lean official footprint — limited or no visible terminal facilities — despite appearing to run significant equipment.
Timeline Red Flag: Fiorito was active during the same operational periods as Bee Zone Logistics and Hope Trans, suggesting possible parallel operations rather than a completely separate carrier.
While Fiorito’s role is not yet as well-documented, its leadership overlap with Hope Trans, shared infrastructure, and potential equipment transfers point toward it being another puzzle piece in the chameleon carrier strategy: keep multiple DOT numbers active so freight can continue moving if one entity gets flagged.
Status: Inactive for failure to file biennial MCS-150;
Operating Authority: Not Authorized.
Address: 201 E Jefferson St Ste 300, Franklin, IN 46131.
Fleet on file: 1 power unit, 1 driver;
mileage 65,088 (2021).
0 inspections; 0 crashes listed.
Oh but wait there is more....
Bee Zone Logistics — A Mirror Fleet
The since deleted Hope Trans Facebook page listed an email containing “beezone,” tying it to Bee Zone Logistics (USDOT 3191514).
Inspection data revealed 88 trucks with identical VINs between Hope Trans and Bee Zone — proof the same trucks were operating under both names.
Bee Zone Logistics:
Operated 2018–2024.
Officer names cycled: Sarvar Muradov, Mariya Shavrova, Sam Muradov, Patina Magomedova.
Overlapped in lifespan with Hope Trans, suggesting coordinated operation.
Originally run by Mavinder Singh, likely sold to Aishat Magomedova in 2023.
Status: DOT Active but Operating Authority: Not Authorized.
Registered address: 4130 Linden Ave Ste 302, Riverside, OH 45432;
phone (615) 800-6086.
Fleet: 86 power units, 86 drivers.
Declared mileage: 16,225,500 (2023). SAFER Web
Roadside inspections (US, last 24 mo): 197 total;
Vehicle OOS 28.9% (28/97),
Driver OOS 5.1% (10/197). SAFER Web
Crashes (last 24 mo): 0 fatal, 4 injury, 6 tow-away (10 total). SAFER Web
Kardan Trucking — The Third Node
Primary contact: Naida Magomedova (formerly Sarvar Muradov). Remember him from Bee Zone Logistics?
VIN overlaps:
Hope Trans & Kardan Trucking: 50+ trucks
Bee Zone & Kardan Trucking: 100+ trucks
Kardan’s Record Includes Fatalities:
Dec. 9, 2024 (I-80, Iowa) — Driver Alain Hernández Rodríguez killed while driving for a different carrier when his Kardan-owned truck overturned. Passenger injured. Neither wore seat belts.
Jan. 8, 2023 (I-80, Iowa City) — Kardan truck jackknifed on ice, causing a 16-vehicle pileup. Two killed, multiple injured.
RASUA ENTERPRISE LLC — USDOT 3561352 — DOT Active; Authority: Not Authorized
Status: DOT Active; Operating Authority: Not Authorized. Address: 4831 Darrow Rd Unit 106, Stow, OH 44224; phone (224) 239-4292. Fleet listed as 1 power unit, 1 driver; mileage 972,000 (2023). SAFER Web
Roadside inspections (US, last 24 mo): 18 total; Vehicle OOS 16.7% (2/12), Driver OOS 5.6% (1/18).
Crashes (last 24 mo): 0 fatal/injury/tow-away (0 total). SAFER Web
Mail note: FMCSA correspondence to the Stow address was flagged undeliverable it, another red flag for a “paper” office.
Contact patterns: (224) 239-42xx phone block; Patina Magomedova appears as contact.
AG FREIGHT INC — USDOT 2238679 — Broker; Authority: Not Authorized
Address: Lancaster, PA.
Fleet/drivers: 0/0 (broker only).
Inspections/Crashes: 0/0.
Contact overlap: Ties to Patina Magomedova; phone numbers adjacent to RASUA.
The People Behind the Paper: Rotating Officers, Static Operations
Sarvar (“Sam”) Muradov
Appears across Bee Zone and Kardan, plus state records for Muradov LLC, GTL Group LLC, Comston Technologies LLC, Multi Stone Masters LLC (inactive), Biscayne 309 LLC, Fort Myers United Group, Inc., Dana Freight Inc.
Why it matters: A cluster of LLCs can hold titles, lease equipment, route payments, and pivot operations the minute one DOT becomes radioactive.
Patina Magomedova — shows up on Bee Zone, RASUA, AG Freight (all Not Authorized status at points), with the recurring (224) 239-42xx phone pattern.
Mariya Shavrova — appears in Bee Zone officer/contact history during periods overlapping Muradov and Patina; indicates continuity as names rotate.
Aishat Magomedova — the listed Hope Trans officer on crash day and self-described CEO of Fiorito (LinkedIn now deleted). Within days, Todd August replaced her at Hope Trans.(Note: Aishat’s very existence as a distinct, verifiable person has been questioned; records show financial/property ties with Sarvar Muradov, including a $1.6M Florida condo sale.)
Naida Magomedova — Kardan Trucking primary contact in later filings; earlier filings list Sarvar Muradov.
Pattern: Rotating officers, shared phones/emails, overlapping DOTs, and VIN reuse—all the signals of a chameleon carrier network.
The “Chameleon Carrier” Playbook
This is textbook: when a company racks up violations, unpaid claims, or bad safety scores, they shut down and reopen under a new name — same trucks, same people, same habits.
The cost for the public:
Dangerous trucks back on the road
Repeat tragedies like the I-20 crash
Chameleon Carrier Behavior
The recurring red flags:
Multiple DOT numbers tied to the same individuals.
Frequent “Not Authorized” or revoked authority but continued freight activity.
Mail returned undeliverable to FMCSA.
Shared phone numbers and addresses across carriers in different states.
Sudden spikes or implausible mileage on single units.
High OOS rates above national averages.
We uncovered this in less than 24 hours. Do you truly believe federal investigators couldn’t do the same, if they chose to? Consider this your warning: think twice before making reckless decisions—because a prison sentence could be closer than you realize.
Why Chameleon Carriers Exist? (Follow the Money)
The incentives.
Reset CSA/SMS scores by swapping DOTs.
Dodge insurance hikes or non-renewals after crashes.
Outrun audits and investigations by changing officers/addresses.
Shield assets in parallel LLCs to frustrate claimants.
Keep freight (and cash) flowing even as one entity burns down.
The method.
Share VINs across entities (paper-lease them if needed).
Rotate names and emails (dispatch@, hr@).
Use soft addresses: coworking, apartments, P.O. boxes.
Spin up broker shells to source loads despite shaky authority.
Why the system struggles.
FMCSA still relies heavily on names/addresses/EINs—all easy to change.
Data silos between FMCSA, state corp registries, USPS procurement, insurers, and courts.
Lag between violations, ratings, and decisive enforcement.
The Forgery Case—and Why It’s a Big Deal
Indictment.
A Hope Trans official (name not yet public) has been indicted for 3rd-degree felony forgery, accused of falsifying the cab card (vehicle registration document) of the truck.
Warrant.
Arrest warrant issued.
Why it matters?
Networks like this count on the corporate veil. Individual criminal exposure is rare—and it can unravel the entire setup if investigators follow the people, payments, and VINs, not just the logos.
💡 Fact: Our investigation uncovered this network in less than 24 hours. Does anyone truly believe federal investigators couldn’t do the same—if they wanted to?
⚠️ Warning: Think twice before getting involved in schemes like this. A prison sentence might be much closer than you think.
Legal and Regulatory Context – What’s Happening Now and What Could Follow
Criminal Prosecution:
Alexis Osmani Gonzalez-Compagnoni is already facing five counts of manslaughter and four counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.
Prosecutors have shown they are prepared to add new charges as evidence builds—including fraud, false statements, and safety violations.
A representative of Hope Trans LLC has been charged with third-degree felony forgery for altering a cab card (the registration document proving a truck’s legal authority to operate commercially). An arrest warrant has been issued.
Regulatory Measures:
FMCSA can issue out-of-service orders, downgrade the safety rating of related companies, and link all DOT numbers belonging to the network.
USPS is under pressure after an OIG internal audit revealed a lack of effective oversight of contract carriers. Possible actions include contract suspensions or bans, along with an overhaul of safety requirements.
Civil and Insurance Consequences:
Wrongful death and personal injury lawsuits are expected, targeting joint liability among Hope Trans, Bee Zone, Kardan, RASUA, AG Freight, Fiorito, and affiliated LLCs.
Insurers may deny or limit coverage if fraud is proven, likely leading to lawsuits over policy interpretations.
Factoring companies may halt financing if they anticipate major sanctions—potentially triggering the rapid creation of a new DOT number unless regulators link VINs to people, not just company names.
Drivers in the Network:
CDL drivers working for these companies often end up with unpaid wages, face license risks, and can even bear personal criminal liability.
⚠️ Tip: Keep copies of your logs, dispatcher messages, and repair requests—they may be your only protection if investigators come calling.
What the Media Keeps Missing
This isn’t a story about language, passports, or watching YouTube in the cab. This is about a well-oiled money machine—so well-oiled that even regulators let it run while pretending to look elsewhere.
Yes, the driver fell asleep. On a solo USPS run that, by policy, should have had two drivers. But the problem doesn’t end in the cab.
Automation won’t save anyone when the root cause is paper fraud, ELD manipulation, and compromised maintenance.
The real culprits often never touch the wheel. And while the media reduces it to “a bad driver” or “lack of English,” they miss the core—the skill of these bad actors to reincarnate again and again under a new name, with a new DOT number, and keep making money… while someone else pays the price.
Our Expert View
Let’s be clear: This crash wasn’t an “unfortunate accident” or a random twist of fate. It was the predictable outcome of exploiting system loopholes for profit—of an ecosystem that rewards speed, concealment, and document manipulation over public safety.
We’ve seen this movie, and we know the ending: funerals, official statements, and “thoughts and prayers” instead of real change. The I-20 tragedy was years in the making, built on systemic inaction—and the script comes straight from the “Chameleon Carrier” playbook.
The truth is simple: the system doesn’t track danger—it tracks names.
Change the name, repaint the doors, swap the manager—and you’re reborn with a “clean” record. Same trucks. Same people. Same violations. Same deadly risk to every family on the road.
The problem isn’t that regulators don’t know this happens. The problem is they let it happen—again and again.
What Must Change – Concrete Solutions
Track VINs Across DOT Registrations
Currently, a truck’s history is tied to its DOT number, not its VIN. When a carrier “reincarnates,” the history disappears.
Solution: A national database linking VINs to the complete vehicle history, regardless of owner or DOT registration.
Automatic Audits for High-Risk Changes
Sudden changes in ownership, address, management, or fleet size (+/- 20% in a month) are red flags.
Solution: Mandatory FMCSA audit before issuing or updating registration when such changes occur.
Strict Rules for Federal and High-Risk Freight
USPS, Amazon, FedEx, and Walmart could eliminate high-risk carriers from their supply chains.
Solution: Ban companies with high OOS rates from hauling critical freight, and require VIN list checks before contracts.
Break Down Information Silos
Lack of coordination between FMCSA, state registries, USPS, insurers, and courts keeps the scheme alive.
Solution: Linked systems for automatic, real-time data sharing to flag risky carriers.
Real Protection for Whistleblower Drivers
Drivers often know about fraud and violations but are afraid to speak up.
Solution: Federal protections ensuring reinstatement, back pay, and legal aid; anonymous and verifiable reporting channels.
The Bottom Line
If the conversation ends with one name, one DOT number, or one tragic crash—nothing will change. We must stop chasing single “bad actors” and start dismantling the networks that enable them.
Every time we let a chameleon carrier shed its skin and get back on the road, we’re rolling the dice with someone’s life. And next time, the names in the obituary could belong to people you love.
Safety Lane will continue monitoring court cases, FMCSA decisions, and insurance claims tied to this network. If you have information, documents, or confidential tips—contact our investigative team.
Editor’s Note & Disclaimer: This report is based on publicly available information, government records, court filings, and statements from both named and anonymous sources. Every effort has been made to ensure accuracy at the time of publication, but details may change as new information becomes available.
Mention of specific people, companies, or organizations does not imply guilt or liability unless determined by a court of law. This article is intended for public interest and industry awareness only.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions of Safety Lane Magazine, its partners, or staff. If you are mentioned in this report and wish to provide clarification or additional information, we welcome your response for potential inclusion in future coverage.
Credits:
WFAA, Dallas, Texas, Brokersnapshot, SaferWeb, highwayveritas.com, LinkedIn, FaceBook, Google
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